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New Basel Capital Accord [¾çÀå]

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Prefacep. vii
Introduction to the Basel Capital Accordsp. 1
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervisionp. 1
1988 Capital Accord (Basel I)p. 2
The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)p. 4
Conclusionp. 8
Referencesp. 9
The New Basel Capital Accord: Is 8% Adequate?p. 11
The Decline in U.S. Bank Equity Capital/Asset Ratiosp. 12
Changing Risk Profile of Banksp. 14
Conclusionp. 22
Referencesp. 24
Why and How Banks Fail--Would 8% Capital Make a Difference?p. 29
My Experiences with Troubled Banksp. 29
I Moved on to the Bank of New England
Corporationp. 31
Four Propositionsp. 32
Conclusionp. 36
Referencesp. 37
Basel II: The Roar That Mousedp. 39
Introductionp. 39
Overview of Basel and Pillar 1p. 40
Supervisory Review (Pillar 2)p. 43
Market Discipline (Pillar 3)p. 46
Conclusionsp. 48
Referencesp. 50
Basel II Creates an Uneven Playing Fieldp. 53
Bank Capitalp. 54
Different Methods of Calculating Credit Risk Give Different Capital Requirementsp. 56
Real Estatep. 56
The 1985-1991 Periodp. 57
Real Estate Lending 2002p. 59
Bank Failures and Loans Charged-Off In 2002p. 62
Conclusionsp. 63
Referencesp. 65
Market Discipline: Is It Fact or Fiction?p. 67
What Is Market Discipline?p. 68
Market Discipline Is Based on Informationp. 71
Insiders and Outsidersp. 73
Does Market Discipline Work for Banks?p. 82
Implicationsp. 84
Conclusionp. 86
Referencesp. 88
Comments on Gup's Paper, "Market Discipline: Is it Fact or Fiction?"p. 95
The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Researchp. 97
Introductionp. 97
Problems with Basel Ip. 100
Objectives of the New Basel Accordp. 101
Key Elements of the Packagep. 102
Questions for Research on Three Frontsp. 107
Final Commentsp. 118
Referencesp. 119
The New Basel Accord and Advanced IRB Approaches: Is There a Case for Capital Incentives?p. 125
Introductionp. 125
Capital Concessions in the New Accordp. 126
Bank Investment in Risk Management Systemsp. 129
Deposit Insurance and Capital Concessionsp. 133
Calculating Capital Concessionsp. 135
Adjusting the Price of Deposit Insurancep. 143
Regulatory Incentives and Risk Managementp. 146
Conclusionp. 147
Referencesp. 148
Pro-cyclicality, Banks' Reporting Discretion, and "Safety in Similarity"p. 151
Introductionp. 153
Literature and Historical Reviewp. 156
Data and Methodologyp. 161
Resultsp. 165
Summary and Implicationsp. 173
Referencesp. 174
The Inadequacy of Capital Adequacy Policies for Financial Institution Regulationp. 177
What is Capital?p. 177
Historical Perspective: Capital Adequacyp. 182
Economic Net-Worth: Capital as a Conditional Random Variablep. 191
Alterenatives to Traditional Capital Adequacyp. 204
Conclusionp. 213
Referencesp. 214
Bank Lending and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Under a Revised Basel Accordp. 217
Introductionp. 217
Risk-Based Capitalp. 220
The Modelp. 221
Unconstrained and Constrained Banksp. 225
Monetary Policy and Credit Ratings Migrationp. 231
Risk Based Capital and Internal Credit Risk Modelsp. 233
Conclusionsp. 234
Referencesp. 236
Is the New Basel Accord Incentive Compatible?p. 239
Introductionp. 239
The Risk Neutral Modelp. 243
Regulatory Capital Requirements for Corporate Lendingp. 246
Shareholder Value Maximization Under Risk Neutralityp. 252
Assessing the Implications of the New Basel Accordp. 260
Modeling Investor Risk Aversionp. 263
Optimal Bank Behavior when Shareholders are Risk Aversep. 267
Conclusionp. 277
Appendixp. 278
Referencesp. 283
Optionality and Basel IIp. 285
Introductionp. 285
The Effect of Interest Rate Changes on a Fully Immunized Bankp. 288
Interest Rate Changes--Positive and Negative Durationp. 295
Conclusionp. 300
Referencesp. 301
The Impact of the Basel II Capital Accord on Australian Banksp. 305
Introductionp. 305
The Rationale for Prudential Regulationp. 306
The Structure of the Australian Banking Industryp. 308
Prudential Regulation in Australiap. 312
The Impact of Basel I on the Australian Banking Systemp. 315
The Potential Impact of Basel II on the Australian Banking Systemp. 319
Conclusionp. 332
Referencesp. 333
Basel Skepticism: From a Hungarian Perspectivep. 337
Introductionp. 337
Diverging Reactions: Europe Versus the United Statesp. 338
Dilemmas and Trade-Offs of the Average Hungarian Bankp. 347
Procyclicality of the Hungarian Banking Systemp. 361
Conclusions or Basel Scepticsmp. 365
Referencesp. 367
The New Basel Capital Accord and Its Impact on Japanese Banking: A Qualitative Analysisp. 371
Introductionp. 371
The Main Characteristics of the New Basel Accordp. 373
The Japanese Banking Sectorp. 378
Lessons from the Past: Basel I and Japanese Banksp. 398
The Formal Reaction of Japanese Banks to the New Basel Accordp. 401
The Tactical and Strategic Implications of the New Basel Accord for Japanese Bankingp. 403
Conclusionsp. 428
Referencesp. 430
About the Authorsp. 443
Indexp. 449
Table of Contents provided by Rittenhouse. All Rights Reserved.

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Becoming operational in 2007, the Basel Capital Accord initiative is an effort to bring order to international capital markets and level the playing field for banks. Bottom line, officials hope to align capital with the risks faced by banks. However, despite the worldwide endorsements by regulators, the Accord may not be the "sure thing" everyone hopes it will be. It is very costly to implement and is not suitable for all banks. The question remains, though: Will it succeed? Gathering perspectives from the top minds in the field of international banking and finance, Gup's intriguing book The New Basel Capital Accord offers authoritative, provocative, and practical discussion and analysis of the impact of the Accord and discusses new opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.

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