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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 11 (71)
Note on the Text 82 (3)
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 85 (404)
PREFACE TO THE 1788 EDITION 85 (2)
I INTRODUCTION 87 (3)
II CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND 90 (4)
INFLUENCE
III THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 94 (3)
IV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 97 (4)
V THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 101(3)
VI CONCERNING DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE 104(5)
STATES
VII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND PARTICULAR 109(4)
CAUSES ENUMERATED
VIII THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR IN 113(5)
PRODUCING STANDING ARMIES AND OTHER
INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO LIBERTY
IX THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD 118(4)
AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION
X THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 122(6)
XI THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO 128(6)
COMMERCE AND A NAVY
XII THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO 134(4)
REVENUE
XIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW 138(2)
TO ECONOMY
XIV AN OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE EXTENT OF 140(5)
COUNTRY ANSWERED
XV CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT 145(6)
CONFEDERATION IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN THEIR
COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES
XVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION 151(5)
TO THE SAME PRINCIPLE
XVII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND ILLUSTRATED 156(3)
BY EXAMPLES TO SHOW THE TENDENCY OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTS RATHER TO ANARCHY AMONG THE
MEMBERS THAN TYRANNY IN THE HEAD
XVIII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER 159(5)
EXAMPLES
XIX THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER 164(5)
EXAMPLES
XX THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER 169(3)
EXAMPLES
XXI FURTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT 172(5)
CONSTITUTION
XXII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED 177(7)
XXIII THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST 184(4)
EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED
XXIV THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH AN ANSWER TO 188(4)
AN OBJECTION CONCERNING STANDING ARMIES
XXV THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW 192(4)
XXVI THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW 196(5)
XXVII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME 201(3)
VIEW
XXVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONCLUDED 204(4)
XXIX CONCERNING THE MILITIA 208(4)
XXX CONCERNING TAXATION 212(4)
XXXI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 216(4)
XXXII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 220(3)
XXXIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 223(3)
XXXIV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 226(5)
XXXV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 231(4)
XXXVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 235(6)
XXXVII CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE 241(6)
CONVENTION MUST HAVE EXPERIENCED IN THE
FORMATION OF A PROPER PLAN
XXXVIII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND THE 247(7)
INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN
EXPOSED
XXXIX THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN TO 254(5)
REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES: AN OBJECTION IN
RESPECT TO THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION
EXAMINED
XL THE SAME OBJECTION FURTHER EXAMINED 259(7)
XLI GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS PROPOSED TO 266(7)
BE VESTED IN THE UNION
XLII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED 273(6)
XLIII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED 279(7)
XLIV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED 286(6)
XLV A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPOSED 292(5)
DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF THE UNION TO THE
STATE GOVERNMENTS
XLVI THE SUBJECT OF THE LAST PAPER RESUMED 297(5)
WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMPARATIVE MEANS
OF INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
GOVERNMENTS
XLVII THE MEANING OF THE MAXIM, WHICH 302(6)
REQUIRES A SEPARATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF
POWER, EXAMINED AND ASCERTAINED
XLVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A 308(4)
VIEW TO THE MEANS OF GIVING EFFICACY IN
PRACTICE TO THAT MAXIM
XLIX THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE 312(4)
SAME VIEW
L THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME 316(2)
VIEW
LI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME 318(4)
VIEW AND CONCLUDED
LII CONCERNING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 322(4)
WITH A VIEW TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE
ELECTORS AND ELECTED, AND THE TIME OF SERVICE
OF THE MEMBERS
LIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW 326(5)
OF THE TERM OF THE SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS
LIV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW 331(4)
TO THE RATIO OF REPRESENTATION
LV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO 335(4)
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE BODY
LVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION 339(4)
TO THE SAME POINT
LVII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION 343(4)
TO THE SUPPOSED TENDENCY OF THE PLAN OF THE
CONVENTION TO ELEVATE THE FEW ABOVE THE MANY
LVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION 347(5)
TO THE FUTURE AUGMENTATION OF THE MEMBERS
LIX CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF ELECTIONS 352(4)
LX THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 356(4)
LXI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED 360(4)
LXII CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 364(5)
SENATE WITH REGARD TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF
THE MEMBERS, THE MANNER OF APPOINTING THEM,
THE EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION, THE NUMBER OF
THE SENATORS AND THE DURATION OF THEIR
APPOINTMENTS
LXIII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 369(6)
THE SENATE IN REGARD TO THE DURATION OF
APPOINTMENT OF ITS MEMBERS
LXIV A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 375(5)
THE SENATE IN REGARD TO THE POWER OF MAKING
TREATIES
LXV A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 380(4)
THE SENATE IN RELATION TO ITS CAPACITY AS A
COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS
LXVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 384(5)
LXVII CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 389(3)
PRESIDENT: A GROSS ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT
THIS PART OF THE PLAN DETECTED
LXVIII THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 392(4)
PRESIDENT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE MODE
OF APPOINTMENT
LXIX THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, WITH A 396(6)
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE KING
OF GREAT BRITAIN ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK ON THE OTHER
LXX THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO 402(7)
THE UNITY OF THE EXECUTIVE, WITH AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PROJECT OF AN EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL
LXXI THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN REGARD TO 409(3)
THE DURATION OF THE OFFICE
LXXII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN REGARD TO 412(5)
THE RE-ELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
LXXIII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION 417(5)
TO THE PROVISION CONCERNING SUPPORT AND THE
POWER OF THE NEGATIVE
LXXIV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO 422(2)
THE COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL FORCES AND THE
POWER OF PARDONING
LXXV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO 424(4)
THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES
LXXVI THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO 428(4)
THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFICERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT
LXXVII THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 432(4)
PRESIDENT CONCLUDED, WITH A FURTHER
CONSIDERATION OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT,
AND A CONCISE EXAMINATION OF HIS REMAINING
POWERS
LXXVIII A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 436(6)
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TENURE
OF GOOD BEHAVIOR
LXXIX A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL 442(3)
DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS FOR
THE SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGES
LXXX A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL 445(5)
DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE EXTENT OF ITS
POWERS
LXXXI A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL 450(8)
DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF
ITS AUTHORITY
LXXXII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL 458(3)
DEPARTMENT IN REFERENCE TO SOME MISCELLANEOUS
QUESTIONS
LXXXIII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL 461(12)
DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TRIAL BY JURY
LXXXIV CONCERNING SEVERAL MISCELLANEOUS 473(8)
OBJECTIONS
LXXXV CONCLUSION 481(8)
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 489(20)
Index 509

‘The establishment of a Constitution, in a time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY’

Written at a time when furious arguments were raging about the best way to govern America, The Federalist Papershad the immediate practical aim of persuading New Yorkers to accept the newly drafted constitution in 1787. In this they were supremely successful, but their influence also transcended contemporary debate to win them a lasting place in discussions of American political theory. Acclaimed by Thomas Jefferson as 'the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written', The Federalist Papers make a powerful case for power-sharing between State and Federal authorities and for a constitution that has endured largely unchanged for more than two hundred years. In his brilliantly detailed introduction, Isaac Kramnick sets the Papers in their historical and political context. This edition also contains the American constitution as an appendix.