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This Time Is Different : Eight Centuries of Financial Folly

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"Winner of the 2011 Gold Medal Arthur Ross Book Award, Council on Foreign Relations"

"Winner of the 2010 Paul A. Samuelson Award, TIAA-CREF"

"One of USA Today's "Year's Best Business Books To Make Sense of Financial Crisis""

"Listed on Bloomberg.com by James Pressley as one of "our favorite financial-crisis books this year""

"Shortlisted for the 2010 Spear's Book of the Year Award in Financial History"

"Finalist for the 2011 Estoril Global Issues Distinguished Book Prize"

"Runner-Up for the Book of the Year, The Atlantic"

"Finalist for the 2009 Business Book Award ("Best of the Rest") in Current Interest, 800-CEO-READ"

"Kenneth Rogoff, Recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics, Center for Financial Studies"

"One of Library Journal Best Business Books - Economics/U.S. Economy category"

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LIST OF TABLES xiii

LIST OF FIGURES xvii

LIST OF BOXES xxiii

PREFACE xxv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxxvii

PREAMBLE: SOME INITIAL INTUITIONS ON FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND THE FICKLE NATURE OF CONFIDENCE xxxix





PART I: Financial Crises: An Operational Primer 1

Chapter 1: Varieties of Crises and Their Dates 3

Crises Defined by Quantitative Thresholds: Inflation, Currency Crashes, and Debasement 4

Crises Defined by Events: Banking Crises and External and Domestic Default 8

Other Key Concepts 14

Chapter 2: Debt Intolerance: The Genesis of Serial Default 21

Debt Thresholds 21

Measuring Vulnerability 25

Clubs and Regions 27

Reflections on Debt Intolerance 29

Chapter 3: A Global Database on Financial Crises with a Long-Term View 34

Prices, Exchange Rates, Currency Debasement, and Real GDP 35

Government Finances and National Accounts 39

Public Debt and Its Composition 40

Global Variables 43

Country Coverage 43





PART II: Sovereign External Debt Crises 49

Chapter 4: A Digression on the Theoretical Underpinnings of Debt Crises 51

Sovereign Lending 54

Illiquidity versus Insolvency 59

Partial Default and Rescheduling 61

Odious Debt 63

Domestic Public Debt 64

Conclusions 67

Chapter 5: Cycles of Sovereign Default on External Debt 68

Recurring Patterns 68

Default and Banking Crises 73

Default and Inflation 75

Global Factors and Cycles of Global External Default 77

The Duration of Default Episodes 81

Chapter 6: External Default through History 86

The Early History of Serial Default: Emerging Europe, 1300-1799 86

Capital Inflows and Default: An "Old World" Story 89

External Sovereign Default after 1800: A Global Picture 89





PART III: The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt and Default 101

Chapter 7: The Stylized Facts of Domestic Debt and Default 103

Domestic and External Debt 103

Maturity, Rates of Return, and Currency Composition 105

Episodes of Domestic Default 110

Some Caveats Regarding Domestic Debt 111

Chapter 8: Domestic Debt: The Missing Link Explaining External Default and High Inflation 119

Understanding the Debt Intolerance Puzzle 119

Domestic Debt on the Eve and in the Aftermath of External Default 123

The Literature on Inflation and the "Inflation Tax" 124

Defining the Tax Base: Domestic Debt or the Monetary Base? 125

The "Temptation to Inflate" Revisited 127

Chapter 9: Domestic and External Default: Which Is Worse? Who Is Senior? 128

Real GDP in the Run-up to and the Aftermath of Debt Defaults 129

Inflation in the Run-up to and the Aftermath of Debt Defaults 129

The Incidence of Default on Debts Owed to External and Domestic Creditors 133

Summary and Discussion of Selected Issues 136





PART IV: Banking Crises, Inflation, and Currency Crashes 139

Chapter 10: Banking Crises 141

A Preamble on the Theory of Banking Crises 143

Banking Crises: An Equal-Opportunity Menace 147

Banking Crises, Capital Mobility, and Financial Liberalization 155

Capital Flow Bonanzas, Credit Cycles, and Asset Prices 157

Overcapacity Bubbles in the Financial Industry? 162

The Fiscal Legacy of Financial Crises Revisited 162

Living with the Wreckage: Some Observations 171

Chapter 11: Default through Debasement: An "Old World Favorite" 174

Chapter 12: Inflation and Modern Currency Crashes 180

An Early History of Inflation Crises 181

Modern Inflation Crises: Regional Comparisons 182

Currency Crashes 189

The Aftermath of High Inflation and Currency Collapses 191

Undoing Domestic Dollarization 193





PART V: The U.S. Subprime Meltdown and the Second Great Contraction 199

Chapter 13: The U.S. Subprime Crisis: An International and Historical Comparison 203

A Global Historical View of the Subprime Crisis and Its Aftermath 204

The This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome and the Run-up to the Subprime Crisis 208

Risks Posed by Sustained U.S. Borrowing from the Rest of the World: The Debate before the Crisis 208

The Episodes of Postwar Bank-Centered Financial Crisis 215

A Comparison of the Subprime Crisis with Past Crises in Advanced Economies 216

Summary 221

Chapter 14: The Aftermath of Financial Crises 223

Historical Episodes Revisited 225

The Downturn after a Crisis: Depth and Duration 226

The Fiscal Legacy of Crises 231

Sovereign Risk 232

Comparisons with Experiences from the First Great Contraction in the 1930s 233

Concluding Remarks 238

Chapter 15: The International Dimensions of the Subprime Crisis:

The Results of Contagion or Common Fundamentals? 240

Concepts of Contagion 241

Selected Earlier Episodes 241

Common Fundamentals and the Second Great Contraction 242

Are More Spillovers Under Way? 246

Chapter 16: Composite Measures of Financial Turmoil 248

Developing a Composite Index of Crises: The BCDI Index 249

Defining a Global Financial Crisis 260

The Sequencing of Crises: A Prototype 270

Summary 273





PART VI: What Have We Learned? 275

Chapter 17: Reflections on Early Warnings, Graduation, Policy Responses, and the Foibles of Human Nature 277

On Early Warnings of Crises 278

The Role of International Institutions 281

Graduation 283

Some Observations on Policy Responses 287

The Latest Version of the This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome 290





DATA APPENDIXES 293

A.1. Macroeconomic Time Series 295

A.2. Public Debt 327

A.3. Dates of Banking Crises 344

A.4. Historical Summaries of Banking Crises 348

NOTES 393

REFERENCES 409

NAME INDEX 435

SUBJECT INDEX 443

Ã¥¼Ò°³

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned.


Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur.


An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.

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